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INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the costs of shareholder activism have declined.1  This
is partly a result of the new power of proxy advisors, to whom many insti-
tutional investors have outsourced their proxy voting decisions.2  Addi-
tionally, changes in SEC rules have resulted in shareholder activism
decline, and, in turn, have led to a tactic that activist hedge funds have
developed to gain high profits with extremely low risk.3  This tactic, “wolf
pack” activism, occurs when activists work in unison to gain control of
corporate boards.4  Effectively, wolf pack activism enables activists to es-
cape corporate defenses, such as the poison pill.5  These results have led to
controversial discussions about whether it is better to endorse or to pre-
* JD, May 2017, University of Michigan Law School. The author is extremely
grateful to the MBELR team for all of their hard work, especially Bradley Puffenbarger. In
addition, the author is grateful to Mark Goldman and Matt Fagan for their insightful
comments on earlier drafts of this note.
1. John C. Coffee, Jr. & Darius Palia, The Wolf at The Door: The Impact of Hedge
Fund Activism on Corporate Governance, 1 ANNALS OF CORP. GOVERNANCE 1, 4 (2016).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Carmen X.W. Lu, Unpacking Wolf Packs, 125 YALE L.J. 773, 773 (2016).
5. Coffee & Palia, supra note 1.
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vent wolf pack activism.6  The practice, moreover, has surged in recent
years.7 In fact, with “activist hedge funds . . . multiplying like algae in a
petri dish,”8 wolf pack activism’s growing popularity merits attention due
to its large impact on corporate governance.
Section I will describe the key players involved in wolf pack activism
and their conflicting motives, including both the members of wolf packs
and those affected by them. Given that not all shareholders have common
interests,9 this will include an analysis of the motives of various types of
shareholders and an analysis of how these diverse motives may affect the
wealth sustainability of companies.  Section II will explain the phenome-
non of wolf packs in corporate governance by describing the circumstances
that lead to their formation and the various regulations (or lack thereof)
pertaining to them.  Section III will describe divergent theories about
shareholder value and how these theories impact views about wolf packs
in corporate governance.  Section IV will analyze the theories, taking into
account the motives of the various players described in Section I.  This
analysis will include a discussion of which players are more likely to adopt
each theory.  Lastly, Section V will discuss potential reforms in light of the
best theory on the impact of wolf pack activism.
I. THE PLAYERS INVOLVED
A. The Shareholder Divide: A Divergence of Interests
Shareholders have an increasingly strong voice in corporate govern-
ance with the emergence of wolf packs.10  This statement is oversimplified,
however, as it implies that all shareholders have a common interest.  In
reality, “shareholders are . . . a fragmented and fractured group with dispa-
rate interests.”11  The truth is that some shareholders have increasingly
strong voices with the emergence of wolf packs and that this may come at
the expense of other passive shareholders.
One immediate problem is that the term “shareholder” includes not
only hedge fund activists who care about short-term benefits but also own-
ers who care primarily about the long-term benefits of the company in
6. Id.
7. Lu, supra note 4.
8. J.C. Coffee, Jr., Activism: A Guide for the Perplexed, CLS BLUE SKY BLOG
(January 25, 2016), http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2016/01/25/hedge-fund-activism-a-
guide-for-the-perplexed/.
9. Martin Lipton, Will a New Paradigm for Corporate Governance Bring Peace?,
HARVARD LAW SCHOOL FORUM ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FINANCIAL REGULA-
TION (October 5, 2015), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2015/10/05/will-a-new-paradigm-for-
corporate-governance-bring-peace/.
10. See generally Lu, supra note 4.
11. Jennifer Hill, The Shifting Balance of Power Between Shareholders and the Board:
News Corp’s Exodus to Delaware and Other Antipodean Tales at 21 (Vanderbilt Law and
Economics Research Paper No. 08-06) (January 1, 2008), https://ssrn.com/abstract=1086477.
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which they hold stock.12  Wolf packs are composed mainly of the former
type of shareholder, not the latter.13  As shareholders who are motivated
primarily by short-term stock increases gain a stronger voice, their actions
may have a powerful impact on other shareholders, the board, and the
wealth sustainability of companies.14
The composition of shareholders in public companies has changed sig-
nificantly since the 1960’s when Congress enacted the Williams Act.15  At
that time, around 80% of shares in US corporations were held by widely
dispersed, individual shareholders who did not have the resources or the
incentives to remain well informed.16  By contrast, in the modern corpo-
rate governance climate, most shares are owned by institutional investors
(such as hedge funds) who do have the resources and the incentives to
remain active participants in shareholder democracy.17  As stated earlier,
wolf packs are typically composed of this category of shareholder.18  How-
ever, wolf packs may also be composed of other active shareholders who
are not activist hedge funds, but who seek to bring about positive changes
in corporations in order to create value for both themselves and passive
shareholders.19
Before opining on whether the laws which affect wolf packs should be
changed, it is necessary to examine the interests of the main players in-
volved, or those who will be affected by any proposed reform.  According
to the Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court, Leo Strine, Jr., a
proper understanding of the interests of those involved in wolf packs is
necessary before we can consider how our corporate governance system
should regulate activist hedge funds.20  He explains that this focus on the
various types of shareholders allows us to “humanize our lens and remind
ourselves of the realities of who living, breathing investors are, and the
ways in which they are allowed to participate in the system, and the effect
these realities have on what corporate governance system would be best
for them.”21
12. See Leo E. Strine, Jr., Who Bleeds When the Wolves Bite? A Flesh-and-Blood Per-
spective on Hedge Fund Activism and our Strange Corporate Governance System, 126 YALE
L. J. 1870, 1871–72 (2017).
13. Id. at 1872.
14. See generally Lipton, supra note 9.
15. Andrew E. Nagel et al., The Williams Act: A Truly “Modern” Assessment,
HARVARD LAW SCHOOL FORUM ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FINANCIAL REGULA-




18. Strine, supra note 12.
19. See Nagel et al., supra note 15.
20. Strine, supra note 12, at 1876.
21. Id. at 1870.
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For example, shareholders who are not members of hedge funds may
be investing in companies to save their money for long-term future use, for
example, to pay for college or for retirement.22  For most Americans, once
funds are invested in a 401(k) plan, the funds are out of their reach until
they reach age fifty-nine and a half.23  While that is just one example of a
plan that focuses workers’ reliance on sustainable wealth creation, it illus-
trates the fact that most workers will not benefit from temporary stock
bubbles or unsustainable strategies (arguably including wolf pack activ-
ism) without a long-term benefit.24
On the other hand, activist hedge funds are, by definition, much more
involved than the typical shareholder.25  They are focused on generating
profit by implementing major changes in public companies, including:
changes to investment strategies, financing structure, or the number of em-
ployees in a company.26  In order to effect these changes, activist investors
often purchase a large stake in a public company and then lobby manage-
ment to implement changes that the activists believe will increase share-
holder value.27  They may also effect change by using a proxy contest to
win support of a company’s other shareholders.28
B. Shareholders and the Board: Power Dynamics
By allowing shareholders to privately lobby other shareholders, the
SEC has made it possible for the outcome of matters presented to a share-
holder vote to be decided privately, out of view of both the corporation
and the typical, passive shareholders who are mostly concerned with long-
term growth.29  There is widespread concern that activist hedge funds in-
creasingly exploit the reporting rules promulgated by the SEC to the dis-
advantage of ordinary investors.30
According to a Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz founding partner and
corporate governance innovator, Martin Lipton, “[o]ur corporate govern-
ance system is structured similarly to our national government” in the
sense that “[u]ltimate power rests with the shareholders who cannot act
22. Id.
23. Id. at 1878; see also I.R.C. § 72(t)(2)(A)(i) (2012).
24. Strine, supra note 12, at 1878.
25. See generally Anita Anand & Andrew Mihalik, Coordination and Monitoring in
Changes of Control: The Controversial Role of “Wolf Packs” in Capital Markets (Osgoode
Hall Law Sch. Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 34, 2017), https://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2906755.
26. Lu, supra note 4.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Lipton, supra note 9.
30. See Theodore Mirvis, Activist Abuses Require SEC Action on Section 13(d) Re-
porting, HARVARD LAW SCHOOL FORUM ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FINANCIAL
REGULATION (Mar. 31, 2014), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2014/03/31/activist-abuses-re
quire-sec-action-on-section-13d-reporting/.
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directly but only through their elected representatives—the directors.”31
Directors are elected annually, and shareholders can change the composi-
tion of the board through various mechanisms provided by state and fed-
eral law.32  When shareholders are able to circumvent these mechanisms
intended to restrain them, power inevitably shifts from the board, as rep-
resentative intermediaries, directly to the shareholders.  This is concern-
ing, as “shareholders are likely to abuse participatory powers, engage in
opportunism, [and] prefer their private sectional interests to those of
shareholders generally.”33  If this assumption is true, one must not only
worry about protecting companies from shareholders or shareholders from
companies, but also about protecting shareholders from each other.34
Therefore, the traditional framework for thinking about shareholders
and the board is flawed in primarily emphasizing the divide between
shareholders and corporations.  Given the current state of the law in the
United States and considering the notion that wolf packs shift the balance
of power between corporate boards and shareholders, it may make more
sense to consider three primary groups: shareholders motivated by short-
term interests, shareholders motivated by long-term interests, and board
members (who may be motivated by either of these interests).
II. DEFINITION AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING FORMATION
Shareholders with parallel interests, acting together to effect change in
a given corporation without disclosing their collective interests, have come
to be known as “wolf packs.”35  As stated earlier, these packs are typically
composed of activist hedge funds.36  Additionally, these activist hedge
funds usually congregate around a target company, where one fund acts as
a “lead” activist, while the others act as peripheral activists.37
Activist investors work together because their combined presence in a
company’s stock increases the campaign’s likelihood of success.38  When
the group obtains more than five percent of collective ownership in a com-
pany, the lead activist (or “alpha wolf”)39 is required to comply with dis-
31. Martin Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target’s Boardroom, 35 BUS. LAW. 101, 105
(1979).
32. Id.
33. Hill, supra note 11, at 21.
34. Id.
35. Anand & Mihalik, supra note 25.
36. Id.
37. Brav, Dasgupta, & Mathews, Wolf Pack Activism, HARVARD LAW SCHOOL FORUM
ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FINANCIAL REGULATION (Feb. 09, 2015), https://
corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2015/02/09/wolf-pack-activism/.
38. Beth Flaming, Best Defense Against ‘Wolf Pack’ Investors Is To Anticipate Their
Attack, FORBES (Nov. 3, 2015), https://www.forbes.com/sites/danielfisher/2015/11/03/best-
defense-against-wolf-pack-investors-is-to-anticipate-their-attack/#67f9f94117e1.
39. Strine, supra note 12, at 1896.
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closure rules promulgated by the SEC.40  Under Schedule 13D, commonly
known as a “beneficial ownership report,” “when a person or group of
persons acquires beneficial ownership of more than five percent of a vot-
ing class of a company’s equity securities registered under Section 12 of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, they are required to file a Schedule
13D with the SEC.”41  Because the public announcement of the activist’s
campaign usually leads to a positive stock return, the lead activist, who
eventually makes the 13D filing, recruits other investors to join the cam-
paign before the 13D filing goes public.42  The activist then uses the ex-
pected jump in stock price to compensate the other investors for their
support.43
As an example of how this works, the activist (which could be a com-
pany) will first make a purchase in a target company and encourage other
activist investors to follow their lead by also purchasing stock in that com-
pany.44  When the lead activist induces other investors to acquire shares of
the target, it is able to accumulate a larger percentage of de facto owner-
ship before triggering regulation thresholds.45  In other words, investors
accumulate stakes in the target firms before the activists’ campaigns are
publicly disclosed.46
This relationship is mutually beneficial for the activists: “[T]he strength
of the pack is the wolf, and the strength of the wolf is the pack.”47  This
advantage increases the chances of a successful campaign.48 Compared
with other activist investors, the market responds more enthusiastically to
wolf packs with an average of fourteen percent in abnormal returns on the
date of its public appearance.49  Additionally, the presence of a wolf pack
is associated with a statistically significant eight percent increase in buy
and hold abnormal (raw) returns calculated over the duration of the
campaigns.50
40. Schedule 13D, SEC (Dec 5., 2012), https://www.sec.gov/fast-answers/
answerssched13htm.html.
41. Id.
42. Yu Ting Forester Wong, Wolves at the Door: A Closer Look at Hedge Fund Activ-
ism, at 18 (Columbia Business School Research Paper No. 16-11., 2016), https://ssrn.com/
abstract=2721413.
43. See id. at 4.
44. Lu, supra note 4.
45. Wong, supra note 42.
46. Id.
47. RUDYARD KIPLING, The Law of the Jungle, in THE JUNGLE BOOK (1894), http://
www.kiplingsociety.co.uk/poems_lawofjungle.htm.
48. Wong, supra note 42, at 5–6.
49. John C. Coffee, Jr., The Lessons of DuPont: Corporate Governance for Dummies,
CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (June 1, 2015), http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2015/06/01/the-les
sons-of-dupont-corporate-governance-for-dummies/.
50. Wong, supra note 42, at 5, 30.
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In order for activist investors to benefit from joining wolf packs, they
must be careful to buy in to the targeted company while remaining in com-
pliance with the applicable securities laws.  Under the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, if the group’s collective holdings exceed five percent of the
company’s outstanding common stock, then, regardless of how small indi-
vidual holdings are, each member of the group will be subject to enhanced
disclosure requirements under Securities Exchange Act Section 13(d).51
The Williams Act refers to the 1968 amendments to the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934, including Schedule 13D.52  Congress created this Act
to protect companies against corporate raiders’ takeover attempts, by fill-
ing then-existing gaps in federal and state corporate law.53
While five percent is the first threshold that triggers requirements
under the Securities Exchange Act, wolf packs’ obligations increase if the
group’s collective holdings exceed ten percent of the company’s outstand-
ing stock.54  When this threshold is met, all members of the group are not
only required to comply with reporting obligations but also with profit re-
strictions under Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act.55  For ex-
ample, Section 16(b) prohibits profits on purchases and sales of the
company’s shares within any six-month period.56  The rule states:
For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information which may have
been obtained by such beneficial owner, director, or officer by reasons of his
relationship to the issuer, any profit realized by him from any purchase and
sale. . . of any equity security. . . within any period of less than six months,
shall inure to and be recoverable by the issuer.57
In other words, this provision was intended to prevent owners of more
than ten percent of a corporation from using inside information to make a
profit on short-swing security transactions.58
This leaves us with two questions: (1) Do these rules contain a loop-
hole that wolf packs are exploiting, or (2) are wolf packs merely suc-
ceeding in spite of the law because they are disobeying it?  In other words,
are wolf packs succeeding while complying with the law by acquiring less
than five percent of shares, an amount that is sufficient to create a control
block? Or, are they succeeding because of their ability to circumvent the
law based on a technicality about the definition of a “group”?
51. Flaming, supra note 38.
52. See Smilan et al., Preventing ‘Wolf Pack’ Attacks: Williams Act May Help Compa-
nies Fend off Activist Hedge Funds, NAT’L L.J. (Nov. 20, 2006), https://www.lw.com/upload/
pubContent/_pdf/pub1710_1.pdf.
53. Nagel et al., supra note 15.
54. Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (West 2011).
55. Flaming, supra note 38.
56. Id.
57. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b).
58. Securities Exchange Act, § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b); see also Foremost-McKes-
son, Inc. v. Provident Sec. Co., 423 U.S. 232 (1976).
348 Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review [Vol. 7:341
There two ways that wolf packs might successfully accumulate a con-
trol block of shares without being detected.  The first is that wolf packs
may accumulate a block of slightly less than five percent of shares; as such,
the block remains undetected by the SEC because it falls below the statu-
tory threshold.  If despite falling below five percent this ownership per-
centage is still effectively a control block, most other shareholders in the
company would nonetheless be minority shareholders.  In this manner,
even though five percent seems like a relatively small holding, it would be
enough to garner significant control in the entity.  There is some support
for this theory: a block-holder is defined as a shareholder who holds at
least five percent of a company’s shares.59  This means that once wolf
packs are officially deemed to be block-holders, they are required to regis-
ter as a group under Schedule 13D—if they have “an agreement to act in
concert.”60
It is the latter requirement of “an agreement to act in concert” which
raises the second possibility: wolf packs are not complying with the disclo-
sure requirements even after they collectively acquire more than five per-
cent, because they fall outside the statutory definition of a “group.”  There
is strong evidence for this theory. For example, “through stock watch ser-
vices, companies may discover that they have many more activists in their
stock than Schedule 13D filings and publicly available information re-
veal.”61  Although shareholders act in concert, they are not affiliated with
each other and do not form a “group” under SEC rules.62  In this manner,
wolf packs deliberately avoid the group characterization to circumvent dis-
closure rules under the securities laws.63  Investors can collectively accu-
mulate big stakes and act together without actually coordinating, “much as
schools of fish or flocks of birds manage to move in unison without mem-
bers talking to each other.”64  This phenomenon may be possible due to
the lack of a public agreement acknowledging the formation of a wolf
pack.65  As such, having an undocumented mutual understanding may vir-
tually guarantee that these shareholder groups cannot be punished for fail-
ing to comply with the disclosure requirements on “groups.”  In order to
establish liability, moreover, the SEC must show that a tippee (receiver of
59. Alex Edmans, Blockholders and Corporate Governance 2 (Ann. Rev. of Fin.
Econ., Working Paper, 2014), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2285781.
60. Leonard Chazen & Jack Bodner, Conscious Parallelism May Justify a Wolf Pack
Pill, LAW360 (May 27, 2014), https://www.cov.com/~/media/files/corporate/publications/2014/
05/conscious_parallelism_may_justify_a_wolf_pack_pill.pdf.
61. Flaming, supra note 38.
62. Id.
63. Anand & Mihalik, supra note 25.
64. Gregory Millman, The Morning Risk Report: How Activist Wolf Packs Work,
WALL ST. J.: RISK & COMPLIANCE J. (Feb. 19, 2015), https://blogs.wsj.com/riskandcompliance
/2015/02/19/the-morning-risk-report-how-activist-wolf-packs-work/.
65. Chazen & Bodner, supra note 60.
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information about wolf pack activity) paid or promised a personal benefit
to the tipper of information. This is a significant burden.66
A desire to avoid triggering these rules provides strong incentives to
ensure that there is no public agreement among the wolf pack members.67
Therefore, wolf packs actively appear to be uncoordinated, and the pro-
cess by which they form appears to be subtle.68  Indeed, wolf pack activity
is often undetectable by the public.69  If it is possible that activist investors
often follow each other without discussing it, which appears to be the
case,70 then the disclosure rules currently do not serve their purpose of
protecting against all effective control groups; uncoordinated wolf packs
do not meet the definition of those control groups who are required com-
ply with the rules.  For example, changing the rules to require disclosure
after the group’s collective holdings reach three percent would have little
effect, because regardless of what the disclosure requirement is, wolf packs
would effectively be able to ignore it.  In this way, the statutory require-
ment could demand disclosure after a group’s collective holdings exceed a
value as low as two percent or as high as eighty percent, and these require-
ments still would not trigger the disclosure obligations set forth in the rules
because wolf packs would still not meet the definition of “group” in the
statute due to their lack of active coordination.
While activists have traditionally focused on small and significantly un-
derperforming companies,71 there are growing concerns that even large,
well-known public companies (which are not necessarily poor performers)
may be vulnerable to attacks by wolf packs.72  This worry exists partially
because the current statutory arrangement allows activist investors to cir-
cumvent securities regulations and takeover defenses triggered by holding
thresholds.73  According to John Coffee, the main advantage of joining a
wolf pack is that it offers “near riskless profit.”74  First, riskless profits are
obtainable because when the hedge fund leading the pack informs other
activists of its intent to organize a wolf pack, it does not breach any fiduci-
ary duty to the target’s shareholders.75  This means that the lead activist
may inform other potential wolf pack members of its investment in the
target company before its public disclosure of the investment because
“sharing this information with other activists does not cost the lead activist
66. Coffee, supra note 8.
67. See Flaming, supra note 38.
68. See Brav, Dasgupta, & Matthews, supra note 37.
69. Flaming, supra note 38.
70. Wong, supra note 42.
71. Mary Jo White, Chair, SEC, A Few Observations on Shareholders in 2015, (March
19, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/observations-on-shareholders-2015.html#_ftn8.
72. Smilan et al., supra note 52.
73. Wong, supra note 42.
74. Coffee, supra note 49.
75. Id.
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so long as it has finished accumulating its initial position.”76  Secondly, this
kind of exploitation of material, non-public information is legal.77  Addi-
tionally, “an abnormal trading gain of 7–8% is a statistical near-certainty
on the day of the Schedule 13D filing,” so others will join in to get in on
the profit.78 Since a short-term profit is virtually riskless, it is not difficult
for an activist hedge fund to assemble a wolf pack that holds twenty to
thirty percent of shares or more of the target without triggering
disclosure.79
In terms of understanding how wolf packs work, it is important to note
that there is not always a designated leader of the pack.80  One hypothesis
is that wolf packs sometimes arise spontaneously because investors moni-
tor and target the same firms around the same time.81
Whether there is a designated leader or not, by forming wolf packs,
activists’ risk is very low because they can cumulatively gain significant
power with relatively little investment.  For example, activists largely in-
crease their chances of winning proxy contests and can accumulate an un-
detected control block of shares with relatively small holdings.82 By
getting the support of other shareholders via a proxy contest and by ac-
cumulating control, activists can elect their choice of directors and oust the
current board.83
According to Charles Nathan, former Co-Chair of Latham & Watkin’s
Corporate Governance Task Force, “the market’s knowledge of the forma-
tion of a wolf pack (either through word of mouth or public announce-
ment of a destabilization campaign by the lead wolf pack member) often
leads to additional activist funds entering the fray against the target corpo-
ration, resulting in a rapid (and often outcome determinative) change in
composition of the target’s shareholder base seemingly overnight.”84
Either way, given the strong incentives to maximize profits in conjunc-
tion with low risks for wolf packs to form, it is not surprising that wolf
packs are attempting to gain control of corporations.  When high incen-
tives are present with low risks, a framework is established for wolf packs
to alter the corporate environment.
76. Flaming, supra note 38.
77. Coffee & Palia, supra note 1, at 7 n. 14 (quoting Alon Brav, Wei Jiang, Frank
Partnoy, and Randall S. Thomas, Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance and Firm
Performance, 63 J. FIN. 1729 (2008)).
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. See Wong, supra note 42, at 11–12.
81. Id. at 12.
82. See Flaming, supra note 38.
83. See Lu, supra note 4, at 774.
84. Charles M. Nathan, Recent Poison Pill Developments and Trends, HARVARD LAW
SCHOOL FORUM ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FINANCIAL REGULATION (May 12,
2019), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2009/05/12/recent-poison-pill-developments-and-
trends/; see also Brav, Dasgupta, & Matthews, supra note 37.
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III. MAXIMIZING SHAREHOLDER VALUE: THEORIES ON THE
LONG TERM IMPACT OF WOLF PACKS
It is highly controversial whether wolf packs can be advantageous to
companies.  Some view them as short-term predators who merely attempt
to boost the stock price of their target company for short-term gain, while
exiting before the long-term costs are felt.85  Others view them as the
“natural champions of dispersed and diversified shareholders.”86
When considering whether wolf packs are more likely to help or hurt
companies, it seems that part of the divergence in opinion comes from
different ideas of what it means to maximize shareholder value.  It is indis-
putable that “increasing shareholder value is of prime importance for the
management of a company,” and all else being equal, “the higher the
shareholder value, the better it is for the company and management.”87
Controversy arises from different beliefs about what shareholder value
is, how to maximize it, and how the power dynamics of corporations
should be altered in order to do so.  Those who are most concerned about
the motives of directors may point out that faulty decisions by manage-
ment can damage shareholder value; as such, decision-making power
should shift to shareholders.88  When shareholders have more power
through tactics such as wolf pack activism, however, this shift may also
damage shareholder value.
The definition of shareholder value is also in dispute.  Some argue “the
premise of shareholder value, properly understood, is that if a company
builds value, the stock price will eventually follow.”89  Others believe that
the definition of shareholder value is simply a general “desire to maximize
profits.”90  While this latter understanding of shareholder value sounds
like it may apply to both short-term and long-term profits, it often focuses
on the benefits of maximizing only the short-term stock price of a company
A. “Stock First” Theorists
Those who believe that maximizing shareholder value is all about max-
imizing the short term stock price are also more likely to believe that wolf
packs are beneficial to corporate governance.  The basis for this view is a
belief that when a company’s stock price increases, the value of the com-
pany follows.91  Under this view, an initial boost in a stock’s price can
85. Coffee & Palia, supra note 1.
86. Id.
87. Definition of ‘Shareholder Value, ECONOMIC TIMES, http://economictimes.india
times.com/definition/shareholder-value.
88. Id.
89. Michael J. Mauboussin, What Shareholder Value is Really About, HARV. BUS.
REV. (Oct. 3, 2011), https://hbr.org/2011/10/ceos-must-understand-what-crea.
90. Myles Udland, GMO’s Capital’s James Montier Destroys The Idea That Maximiz-
ing Shareholder Value Is Good, BUS. INSIDER (Dec. 2, 2014), http://www.businessinsider.com/
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create long-term wealth sustainability in a company. Herein, I refer to sub-
scribers to this belief as “stock first” theorists.
Congress seems to subscribe to the “stock first” interpretation of
shareholder value, as it has recognized that takeovers of underperforming
companies can benefit shareholders and the economy as a whole.92  The
idea is that activist shareholders (investors) can create value not only for
themselves but also for passive shareholders by assuming the liabilities
necessary to bring about a market-driven corporate change.93  Often, ac-
tivist shareholders will purchase a large stake in a public company and
then lobby the company’s management to implement changes that the in-
vestors believe would increase shareholder value.94  More specifically, ac-
tivists may influence the “governance, capital structure decisions, and
operating performance of target firms.”95
In addition to Congress, the SEC also seems to hold the view that the
involvement of activists is not a trend which it should guard against.96
Mary Jo White, former Chair of the SEC, commented in 2015 on the state
of shareholder activism, stating “activism seeks to bring about important
changes at companies that can increase shareholder value.”97  She seems
to have endorsed wolf pack activism specifically when she added, “an ac-
tivist may also begin a campaign behind the scenes, but go public if it be-
lieves it is not being heard or making enough progress. . . [which] can be
compatible with the kind of engagement that I hope companies and share-
holders can foster.”98
To connect this idea with the big picture and the players described in
Section I, it would appear that hedge funds are more likely to subscribe to
the “stock first” theory than the “value first” theory, at least for the pur-
poses of persuading the SEC not to change its rules.  Value first theorists
believe that if a company builds value, the stock price will eventually re-
flect that value. This theory focuses on the long-term value of the company
and considers a multitude of factors when making that determination,
rather than viewing a short jump in stock as the main indicator. The cur-
rent market does not necessarily reflect the long-term value of a company.
For example, according to a value theorist, a dip in stock price does not
necessarily mean the value of the company has lowered. If the primary
belief in corporate governance is that wolf packs are actually helpful to
public companies regardless of their personal motives, the laws are likely
to reflect that societal belief and remain beneficial to hedge funds seeking
short-term “riskless profits”.
92. See Nagel et al., supra note 15.
93. See id. at 20; see also Alon Brav, Wei Jiang, & Hyunseob Kim, Hedge Fund Activ-
ism: A Review, 4 FOUND. & TRENDS IN FIN. 185 (2009).
94. Lu, supra note 4.
95. Brav, Jiang, & Kim, supra note 93, at 51.
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An argument reflecting the “stock first” theory may go as follows: even
if investors’ motives are for their own short-term benefit, long-term costs
are not necessarily a result. The stock market is long-term oriented and
reflects cash flows many years into the future, regardless of whether the
focus of a particular investor is short-term or long-term.99  Additionally,
research shows that the market reflects long-term value.100  For example,
“if the synergies of combining businesses exceed the premium the acquirer
pays”—which would reflect a long-term benefit and short-term cost—“the
stock of the acquiring company goes up irrespective of the immediate
earnings impact.”101
While much regulatory debate in corporate governance focuses on the
effect of legal rules, “commercial norms and practices may be equally, or
more, important.”102  Promoting the “stock first” theory may positively
skew cultural views about wolf packs, and affect the laws that govern
them, as lawmakers are influenced by general public norms.  Therefore, it
is in a hedge fund’s best interest to subscribe to the “stock first” theory.
As a point of comparison, some developments in Australia show that
“[C]ommercial practices may in some instances effectively subvert legal
rules and generate their own convergence pressures.”103  These develop-
ments are evidence supporting the instinct that the societal views sur-
rounding corporate theories can shape law, or at least impact what is
culturally acceptable under existing laws.
At least in terms of narrow self-interest, however, it does not matter
whether activist hedge funds and other members of wolf packs secretly
subscribe to the “value first” theory and believe that they are hurting the
long-term growth of companies.  This is because they generally will sell
their stake in the company before they would feel this impact.104
B. “Value first” Theorists
A different line of thought about maximizing shareholder value is that
the value of the company must first increase, which will in turn drive up
the stock price. In other words, if a company builds value, the stock price
will eventually reflect that value.105  In this Note, I will refer to those who
hold this belief as “value first” theorists. This Note hypothesizes that
“value first” theorists are more likely to interpret the increase of wolf pack
activism as a threat to the well-being of targeted companies.
99. Mauboussin, supra note 89.
100. Id.
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354 Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review [Vol. 7:341
This hypothesis intuitively makes sense, because if the positive stock
return is merely caused by the public announcement of the activists’ cam-
paign,106 (rather than the natural success of the company) wolf pack activ-
ity increases the stock price before that price truly reflects the value of the
company.  In other words, the stock price only rises due to an announce-
ment, which is something artificial and in a sense completely unrelated to
the company’s actual success. Therefore, this artificial inflation of stock
price creates a disparity between the true value of the company and the
price of its stock. Since the stock market over time will reflect the true
value of the company, the stock price will dip back down in the future
because no new value has been created.
By contrast, a “stock first” theorist would believe that this jump in
stock price truly does reflect the current and long-term value of the com-
pany, despite the fact that it was merely caused by an announcement by
activists. They would want to maximize profits at any given moment by
driving the current stock price up at all costs, while “value first” theorists
would consider it harmful for this belief to drive company decisions be-
cause prioritizing short-term increases in stock price could come at the
cost of the long-term value of the company. “Value first” theorists believe
that this price inflation is merely a bubble that will eventually pop, causing
long-term harm.
It follows that if “value first” theorists believe that the value of the
company must increase before the stock price to achieve long-term sus-
tainable growth, and that a public announcement of an activist’s campaign
does not increase the actual value of the company when it causes the stock
to go up, then they would view wolf packs to be harmful in reaching the
goal of long-term shareholder value maximization.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THEORIES
These contradictory theories produce a number of questions: Is it a
good thing that power has been shifted from corporate boards to activist
shareholders through wolf pack activism? Or, are activists’ short-term mo-
tives hurting companies in the long run? Whose motives are least worri-
some—the board’s or activist shareholders’? Ultimately, which theory is
correct?  It is intuitive that if the value of a company increases, the stock
price will follow.  But is it necessary for sustainable long-term growth that
it happens in that order?
This section will explore the accuracy of the “stock first” theory.  It will
consider whether it is really true that wolf packs and other activist share-
holders can create value not only for themselves but also for passive share-
holders and whether it is true that the market always reflects long-term
value.107
106. See Wong, supra note 42.
107. See Nagel et al., supra note 15; see also Brav, Jiang, & Kim, supra note 93.
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A. Into the Minds of Hedge Funds: Reasons for Quickly Exiting
Companies
Critics of wolf packs argue that hedge funds “purport to be good at
building long-term engines of economic growth, but are public-spirited
enough to leave the resulting growth powerhouses after a few years, even
though their influence on the corporation will last far beyond that.”108
There is a lot at stake:
[T]he pressure to respond to the short-term demands of Wall Street has paved
the way for an economy in which companies are increasingly disconnected
from the state of the nation, laying off workers in huge waves, keeping aver-
age wages low and threatening to move operations abroad in the face of regu-
lations and taxes.109
The pursuit of shareholder value has long been associated with failures
to invest in long-term growth.110  Accordingly, the label of wolf packs as
short-term predators is not meritless.  One study showed that activists exit
on average within 266 days after the filing of the initial Schedule 13D.111
Additionally, most members of a wolf pack exit the target company within
a year.112
One critical question is: if the stock market is truly long-term oriented
and reflects cash flows many years into the future, regardless of whether
the focus of investors is short-term or long-term,113 then why do activist
hedge funds choose to leave their target companies within a year? In other
words, after they have recruited a group of activist investors and spent
time changing company policies, activists are in the best position to know
if they are implementing long-term positive changes to the company, and
nonetheless, most members of a wolf pack exit the target company within
a year.114 Why are the groups in the best position to know whether they
have created long-term benefits for a company so eager to leave it?
There are several possibilities.  An optimistic view highlights that wolf
packs are truly “stock first” theorists, meaning they do believe they are
creating long-term wealth sustainability for the target companies that they
are taking control of, but they still exit within a year because they believe
that those long-term benefits are outweighed by greater short-term finan-
cial benefits they can find elsewhere.  As hedge funds and other activist
investors, by definition, actively spend more time promoting their values
108. Strine, supra note 12, at 1873.
109. Jia Lynn Yang, Maximizing Shareholder Value: The Goal That Changed Corporate
America, THE WASHINGTON POST (Aug. 26, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business
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in companies than passive investors, it makes sense that they would want
to receive more money than a passive investor.  All else being equal,
someone who puts more time into something expects to get more out of it.
It makes sense that wolf pack activists should receive more than a passive
investor in this circumstance to make up for the greater cost of time and
energy.  Otherwise, they’d have no economic incentive to spend the time
and money required above that of a passive shareholder.  That the nature
of the hedge fund industry is fast paced, with members accumulating
short-term gains, does not necessarily reflect the proposition that they are
not also creating long-term value for the companies that they quickly exit.
A more skeptical possibility is that members of wolf packs are actually
“value before stock” theorists. As those who most understand the changes
they have implemented in the target company, they are exiting because
they believe they have created only short-term value (and possibly even
long-term harm). They want to leave before the stock bubble bursts.
As hedge funds are in the best position to understand the impact they
are having on companies, this focus on activist shareholders’ true beliefs is
one avenue that may help determine which theory best reflects market
realities.  A major challenge with figuring out which theory best represents
the condition of the market is that activists’ actions look the same regard-
less of which theory is correct: they exit the company.  Additionally, activ-
ists have an incentive to promote the theory which makes their impact on
corporate governance look best.
B. Long Term Effects of Wolf Packs
Mary Jo White, the former chair of the SEC, has acknowledged that
the growing presence of hedge funds has “undeniably changed the corpo-
rate landscape.”115  While the ultimate question for whether the laws sur-
rounding wolf pack activism need reform is determining whether hedge
funds and other activist shareholders have improved the corporate land-
scape, one key part of this analysis is determining which of the competing
theories of shareholder value is most accurate.  Aside from exploring the
intentions of hedge funds, another avenue that may guide this investiga-
tion involves examining of the long-term effects that wolf packs create for
their target companies.  It is important to compare these effects with any
potential alternative effects resulting from different power dynamics. In
other words, analyzing in the abstract whether wolf packs are creating
long-term benefits or harm for their target companies may be the wrong
way to frame the inquiry, at least in terms evaluating possible reforms.
This is because it is entirely possible that both activist hedge funds and
corporate boards have incentives that may hurt companies, and it is not
clear which group has a more impactful effect.  On the other hand, shifting
power away from one group necessarily implies shifting it to the other.  A
better way to frame the question, therefore, is whether wolf packs are
115. White, supra note 71.
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harming target companies, and if so, what would be the result if more
power were to be shifted to the board?
One criticism of institutional investors is that they promote short-term
thinking over long-term sustainability by creating compensation structures
that prioritize short-term price increases over long-term wealth crea-
tion.116  Additionally, those who “buy and sell stock rapidly” and “do not
intend to be around when the consequences of corporate policies pro-
posed by activist hedge funds come to fruition – will give great weight to
the short-term effect of policies, without adequately considering whether
those policies create too little long-term investment or too much leverage
and externality risk.”117  This problem is seen as a defining element of
corporate scandals, including Enron.118  However, it is not clear whether
shifting power from these institutional investors to the board would im-
prove incentives for long-term wealth creation. Directors have incentives
to keep stock prices inflated so that they can avoid takeover bids and
maintain their position within the company.119  Directors may also be mo-
tivated to inflate short-term stock prices at the expense of shareholder in-
terests if they want to take the best advantage of their stock options.120
Directors may also be generally ineffective, and if they are secure in col-
lecting an annual salary without fear of getting fired by unhappy share-
holders, then they may lack the motivation to improve performance.  In
other words, corporate managers who are more vulnerable to getting fired
deliver better returns.121  If power shifted too much towards corporate
managers and away from shareholders, there may still be negative impacts
on corporate growth.
Keeping in mind that alternative situations to hedge fund activism also
have flaws,122 one study by Professor Lucian Bebchuk suggests that wolf
pack activity has harmful long-term effects.123  Professor Bebchuk’s study
is particularly useful because it looks specifically at the effects of activist
hedge funds on companies with control groups.  These control groups are
the result of shifting more power to directors. This creates a useful com-
parison for determining which alternative is preferable for the long-term
financial health of companies.  This study found that “in the years follow-
ing the intervention of activist hedge funds, the firm value of hedge fund
116. Hill, supra note 11.
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targets deteriorates (sizably) compared to control firms.124  There is also a
“growing recognition of the adverse effects of these attacks on sharehold-
ers, employees, communities, and the economy.”125
Additionally, when the focus has been on increasing the short-term
stock prices of companies, which is the motivation of wolf packs, various
companies have experienced increases in stock price even while the com-
pany suffers.126  For example, changes in IBM saw the company’s stock
price rise during the 1990’s at the same time that it undertook massive
layoffs.127  While the interests of corporations and communities may have
at one time been closely aligned, this is no longer the case.128  In modern
times, “across the United States, as companies continue posting record
profits, workers face high unemployment and stagnant wages.”129
These worrisome facts suggest that the “value first” theory is the best
of the above theories.  These facts support the view that short-term stock
increases do not correlate with long-term increases in company value.
Even worse, short-term stock increases can occur at the same time that
companies are shrinking, and their long-term value is decreasing.
V. REFORM
After examining the impact of wolf packs on the corporate environ-
ment and the broader economy, the next issue is whether the law should
be reformed to protect companies from the threat of wolf packs.
It seems clear from the analysis of the “stock first” theory of share-
holder maximization that it is not the short-term boost in stock price
caused by a wolf pack that leads to a company’s increased value.  How-
ever, that does not mean that wolf packs are useless or incapable of con-
tributing to long-term growth.  Wolf packs are not entirely harmful, as
they can have a powerful effect on unsuccessful companies by removing
ineffective boards.  The biggest problem seems to be that activist share-
holders in wolf packs are motivated by short-term incentives, which can
sometimes have a harmful long-term impact on companies.  Since wolf
packs can be helpful in motivating positive change but can also be harmful
in effecting change that is detrimental to the company in the long run, it is
important to consider how to best align the interests of activist sharehold-
ers with the interests of passive shareholders and with the long term sus-
tainability of their target companies.130  In doing so, it is also important to
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consider how to strike the right power balance between boards and activist
shareholders. The goal should be to reach a corporate governance struc-
ture in which directors have incentives to perform well and are kept in
check by the fear of a wolf pack takeover, while wolf pack activism is also
kept in check by restraints that encourage activism to better align with the
long-term best interests of the target companies.
A. Increase Accountability
Wolf packs are more likely to effectuate positive long-term corporate
change when their self-interest is aligned with long-term goals.  To align
wolf pack activist interests with long-term goals, there should be a process
of accountability where wolf packs and other activist investors are respon-
sible for the interests of investors who have “entrusted their capital to the
market for the long-term.”131 Some commentators have proposed the fol-
lowing method to increase accountability of activist investors: fiduciary du-
ties for activist shareholders akin to those of directors to protect the best
interests of the corporation.132  This change would require that those who
“wield direct voting power over productive corporations do so in a manner
faithful to the best interests of those whose money they control,” including
shareholders who are investing in the company’s long-term growth.133  If
this duty existed, wolf packs would still be incentivized to reap profits and
to takeover companies that are inefficient, but they would also be en-
couraged to channel their efforts towards inefficient companies and to cre-
ate policies that would consider the company’s long-term growth.
While in theory this may sound like an ideal solution to better align the
interests of short-term activist investors with long-term shareholders, there
would be many difficulties with this approach that would most likely out-
weigh the benefits.  First of all, there would be ambiguity about when the
fiduciary duty triggers for a shareholder, especially with wolf pack activism
where it is often unclear at what moment shareholders are acting in con-
cert before they are officially deemed to be a group.  Other relationships
that impose fiduciary duties are much clearer.  For example, a fiduciary
duty between a husband and wife is clearly imposed at the moment of
marriage.134  In the case of shareholders, it would not be fair to impose a
fiduciary duty because they may have exposure without knowing when
they were bound and when they could act solely in their own self-interest.
Furthermore, it would be dangerous to discourage shareholders from act-
ing in their own self-interest because the right to do so fuels investment
and supports the economy.  The chilling effects of imposing duties on insti-
131. Id. at 474.
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tutional investors may discourage takeovers of inefficient companies,
which could harm the economy by reducing the incentives for investment.
There may be better ways to increase accountability of activist inves-
tors and thereby incentivize them to have an eye towards the long-term
growth of companies. For example, if when voting for policies, activist in-
vestors were required to explain their motives, they may be more likely to
support policies aimed at long-term growth.135  Activist investors would
be required to disclose the reasoning behind their proposals and that pro-
cess would create pressure to explain the long-term benefit of their pro-
posals. Ideally, this added pressure to disclose reasoning, couched in terms
of long-term sustainable growth, would incentivize wolf packs to narrow
the scope of companies they target to weaker companies that are in need
of takeover.  It would be significantly easier for them to explain how their
proposals would benefit the long-term growth of target companies if those
companies were actually in need of help, rather than large, successful com-
panies that may actually be harmed by intervention in the long-run.  Ac-
tivist shareholders could sidestep this solution by refusing to be
transparent about their motives, but it would nonetheless require disclo-
sure with which other shareholders, and indeed the broader public, could
agree or disagree.
Although requiring activists to explain their motives regarding various
proposals is an imperfect solution, there may not be a perfect solution.
Depending on the situation, wolf packs can be beneficial in quickly and
effectively turning around an ineffective company, or they can be harmful
in unnecessarily interfering with relatively strong companies for short-
term gain.  Regulating wolf packs risks undercutting the benefits they
sometimes provide in corporate governance.  Indeed, any solution which
shifts too much power away from activist investors risks causing other
problems, such as entrenching leadership of inefficient companies.
B. Narrow the Disclosure Gap
Another method aligning the interests of wolf packs more closely with
those of long-term shareholders is to increase the SEC’s disclosure re-
quirements regarding ownership of shares.  If long-term investors can be-
come aware of the presence of a wolf pack at an earlier stage, their
understanding that a corporate change is taking place may incentivize
them to vote on policies and keep wolf packs in check.  This method also
would give less time for the snowball effect to take place in which activists
tip each other off before any disclosure requirements are triggered.  In this
way, increasing the disclosure requirements would be likely to help in
counteracting the negative impacts of wolf packs and other activist share-
holders who are only motivated by short-term financial gains.
Existing securities laws give activists a long, ten-day period before they
are required to report a cross in the ownership threshold they hold in pub-
135. Strine, supra note 117.
Spring 2018] Theories and Solutions on Wolf Pack Activism 361
licly traded companies.136  This delay gives activist hedge funds plenty of
time to privately spread the word about their plans and to reap the bene-
fits of wolf pack attacks, without disclosing their ownership to the target
company or other investors.137  During this ten-day period, activists can
pool their financial and informational resources, which reduces the cost of
seizing corporate control.138  “Empirical evidence is that an extraordinary
level of trading occurs during the ten day window period before the Sched-
ule 13D is filed.”139
The proposal to limit the large, short-term gain that wolf packs are able
to benefit from would be to narrow this ten-day period from the time of
reaching the five-percent ownership threshold to the time that disclosure is
required.  In this way, other shareholders who care deeply about the long-
term growth of their company would not be left in the dark.  This change
may be possible, since it has been accomplished in other countries: “Both
the U.K. and Australia have much shorter window periods, and the ‘wolf
pack’ is not readily observed in these jurisdictions.”140
The problem is that this proposal may be unrealistic in the United
States because of various differences in our corporate governance scheme.
Shortening this period may not be practical, for example, because disclo-
sures are usually filed by attorneys who need time to communicate with
each other and with their clients.  It would likely be too much of a burden
to shorten the disclosure period below ten days.  Another problem is that
“scarce resources limit the ability of the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) to police the formation of undisclosed hedge fund
groups, and the private remedies available to protect public companies
from control bids by such groups are of limited effectiveness.”141
C. Conclusion
In conclusion, since wolf packs can be beneficial in some circumstances
and harmful in others, any reforms to the status quo must be carefully
crafted so as not to shift the balance of power between shareholders and
directors in a way that will ultimately cause harm to the economy.  In
other words, any approach that would completely eliminate wolf packs
would be dangerous as it would also destroy the benefits they provide
through takeovers of poorly-managed companies.  It is important to look
more closely at the facts and circumstances surrounding situations in
which wolf packs benefit or harm companies and tailor reforms to those
situations.  Rather than try to uniformly decrease the power of wolf packs
(therefore decreasing not only the harm but also the benefits they pro-
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vide), reforms should be aimed at altering the short-term incentives of ac-
tivists so that they more closely align with the long-term growth of their
target companies.  One method is to require disclosure of activists’ long-
term incentives when they make proxy proposals to effectuate change in a
company, but this is just a starting point.  Scholars, practitioners, Congress,
and the SEC should collaborate to propose other potential methods of
using this framework to align the interests of all stakeholders in companies
targeted by wolf packs.
